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Abstract:
“The Platonic Triad and Its Chinese Counterpart” reviews two parallel traditions 
of semiotic realism represented by Plato and Husserl in the West and Mo Zi and 
Ouyang Jian in China respectively. These traditions were largely independent of 
each  other  before  the  20th century,  but  they  share  two  fundamental 
assumptions with regard to meaning. First, there exists an extrasemiotic world 
with its own qualities and attributes. Second, human consciousness is capable 
of knowing and then representing the external world with the help of language. 
Although  there  have  arisen  some  different  theories  on  this  issue  over  the 
centuries,  few  of  them  seem  to  have  systematically  challenged  Mo  Zi  and 
Plato’s  presupposition of  an ontological  reality  which gives rise to meaning, 
hence the historical dominance of the realist theory.
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This paper examines the ontological tradition of philosophical speculations 
over meaning which was started by Plato (c. 428-347 BC) in the West and Mo Zi 
(c.  476-390 BC) in China some two thousand four hundred years ago and has 
remained  very  influential  ever  since.  One  might  argue  that  Platonism  has 
received much criticism, especially in the past century or so, but the fact of the 
matter is that most modern language philosophers have applied themselves to 
criticizing Plato’s inadequacy in explaining the referential  function of language 
rather  than  challenging  his  underlying  assumption  of  an  immaterial  world  of 
“Ideas”.
For  the  Greek  philosopher,  there  are  three  correlates  in  a  word,  that  is, 
sound,  idea/content,  and  thing  and  their  relationship  to  each  other  can  be 
illustrated with the following diagram:
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Figure 1: Plato’s Semiotic Triangle
The dotted line at the bottom of the triangle indicates the indirect nature of 
the  relationship  between  sound  and  thing:  they  are  related  to  each  other 
through a third correlate which is called Idea. Take the word /table/ as an easy 
example. By using the word form for a particular piece of furniture of a certain 
size and color made of a certain kind of material in a specific historical period, the 
speaker or writer is actually linking the object in question with all other objects 
that share the same quality of <tablehood>. The meaning of /table/,  in other 
words, is not a singular occurrence of the object but a set or class which is a 
conceptual entity.
Many  20th-century  language  philosophers  are  dissatisfied  with  Plato’s 
tripartite division of the verbal sign. For example, it has often been argued that 
there is no mediation between the word form and the object of a proper name. 
On close analysis, however, this argument does not seem to hold water because, 
strictly speaking, the great majority of proper names used in our daily life are not 
to be counted as elements of a language system. Under normal circumstances, 
their referents are known only to less than one hundred speakers, and therefore 
belong to what may be called “a much more limited code”. Take for instance a 
person with the name Steven Cramer. Because he is not a star in any field nor an 
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occupant of some important public office, the identification of the name with the 
actual person holding it is restricted to a small circle of relatives and friends plus 
a  limited  number  of  schoolmates  and  colleagues  or  co-workers.  That  is  why 
ordinary names do not make their way into the dictionary as components of a 
lexicon.  And  when  they  do  make  their  appearances  in  the  dictionary  as 
commonly used names, the nature of their function changes, that is, they have 
taken on a universal meaning over and above the fact of pointing to objects. The 
name /Sue/, for instance, contains the semantic property of <femaleness> and 
/David/ indicates that of <being used by a human being of the masculine sex>. In 
the case of proper names referring to known historical personages, we find the 
same kind  of  mediation  between  the  word  form  and  object.  The  expression 
/Nixon/ does not just  refer  to a physical  person,  but serves as a well-defined 
lexical unit alongside other semantic entities of historical figures. To say the very 
least,  the  meaning  of  /Nixon/  should  contain  a  semantic  property  of 
<dishonesty> because of the Watergate scandal the name-carrier was involved in 
during his presidency.
For  a  very  recent  discussion  of  the  issue,  we  may  turn  to  Willy  Van 
Langendonck’s  Theory  and  Topology  of  Proper  Names in  which  he invites  his 
readers to consider the following:
(4) John attended a meeting today.
(5) The Emperor Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo.
(6) You are talking about a different John.
(7) He is becoming a second Napoleon. 
To many people, the proper names in the sentences above may seem to have 
the same referential function, but that is not exactly the case as is made clear by 
Langendonck’s analysis:
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In (4) and (5)  John,  Napoleon and  Waterloo function in a way that reflects 
what is commonly considered the primary function of proper names, i.e. to 
refer to individual entities. … By contrast, in (6) one is speaking of at least two 
different persons called  John.  In sentence (7) the NP  a second Napoleon is 
about another man resembling Napoleon. (2007: 11)
What needs to be emphasized again is that because the “individual entities” 
referred to by Langendonck’s first group of proper nouns are known to only a 
small number of people, they are not listed as formal entries of a dictionary. In 
contrast, Langendonck’s second group of proper nouns are counted as fixed units 
of a national language because they have acquired new lexical meanings that are 
“universal”. As such, /John/ does not just refer to <the specific person known to 
the  speaker  and  a  few  other  people>,  but  <any  person  called  Johnson>; 
likewise, /Napoleon/ is not just the name for <the real person who once served 
as the Emperor of France>, but <any one who shares the personality traits of 
Napoleon>. 
A more respectable, although equally erroneous, challenge comes from those 
who contend that  to  understand a sentence is  to  know what  state  of  affairs 
would make it true or false and the notion of meaning is best explained in terms 
of truth rather than reference. The sentence /Snow is white/, for instance, can be 
considered true if, and only if, snow is white. For a layman, such a formula may 
look  very  attractive  because  it  depends  on  a  simple  mechanism  of  pairing 
linguistic entities with nonlinguistic states of affairs,  but the correlation is not 
really  helpful  for  the reason that referent as a concept should cover not only 
people, objects, and places that actually exist in the world but also those that are 
imagined  or  invented  by  language  users.  In  a  sentence  like  /Cheng  Shujian 
dreamed of a dragon/, the subject /Cheng Shujian/ refers to a real person living 
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in one of the residential towers in Gold Coast, Hong Kong at the present time, the 
verb  /dreamed  of/  indicates  a  particular  (subconscious)  way  of  encountering 
things or events, but the object /dragon/ is a gigantic flying reptile that exists 
only in Chinese mythologies. Does the fact that one of its words has no physical 
correspondence  make  the  sentence  less  referential?  Umberto  Eco  has  the 
following to say:
If I declare that /There are two natures in Christ, the human and the divine, 
and one Person / a logician or scientist might observe to me that this string of 
sign-vehicles has neither extension nor referent – and that it could be defined 
as lacking meaning and therefore as a pseudo-statement. But they will never 
succeed in explaining why whole groups of people have fought for centuries 
over a statement of this kind or its denial. Evidently this happened because 
the  expression  conveyed  precise  contents  which  existed  as  cultural  units 
within a civilization. (Eco 1976: 68)
From a liberal semiotic point of view, in other words, it does not matter if a 
lexical unit refers to a product of fantasy or hallucination as opposed to a real 
person, place, object, event, or state of affairs; what is important is “to know 
which  cultural  unit  (what  intentionally  analyzable  cultural  properties) 
corresponded to the content of that word”.
Finally, there is a widely held view that a linguistic utterance may refer to one 
thing but  mean another.  According to J.  L.  Austin,  the founder of  speech act 
theory,  every  time  we  say  something  we  are  also  performing  a  particular 
linguistic  function indicated by the verb which is  contained or  implied in  the 
sentence.  For  example,  if  we  utter  /I  shall  be  there/,  the  sentence  can  be 
interpreted  as  a  prediction,  a  promise,  or  a  warning  depending  on  the 
circumstances. The meaning of the utterance in this case, or any other case by 
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extension, is nothing but its illocutionary potential. As such, speech act theory 
has certainly alerted us to the importance of language context in the process of 
human communication, yet its definition of meaning is too broad to be of much 
use given the fact the possibilities of employing a word in different situations are 
almost limitless. Besides, the fact that an utterance may have illocutionary and 
perlocutionary forces does not entail a total loss of meaning for ordinary words 
like /school/ and /students/. In the final analysis, all words are used to refer to 
something,  in one way or  another,  and this  referential  fact  brings us back to 
where we started: the ancient semiotic triangle propounded by Plato.
Modern language philosophers’ failure to go beyond Plato’s semiotic triad, 
however, does not mean that the model cannot be re-examined from a different 
perspective. One may, in fact, call into question Plato’s metaphysical explanation 
of  the  logical  sequence  of  the  three  correlates  of  a  sign.  Going  back  to  the 
example we used earlier about <tablehood>, the notion, according to Plato, is 
not a mental entity or an idea in the mind of a person formed as a result of his 
having seen many concrete  tables;  rather  it  is  an unchanging universal  or  an 
immortal  Idea  that  exists  independently  of  space and time.  One  the level  of 
referentiality, Plato’s theory of Ideas certainly makes sense in that when we are 
given /table/  as a lexical  item in the dictionary,  we are actually  encountering 
something  that  is  apart  from space  and  time,  but  it  raises  another  question 
which is epistemological in nature: how are abstract universals or general ideas 
related to concrete things or specific objects of the experiential world?
Plato’s  own answer  to the question  comes from his  doctrine  of  shadows. 
According to his explanation, all things we perceive with our senses are imperfect 
copies  of  eternal  Ideas.  In  the  famous  myth  presented  in  Book  VII  of  The 
Republic, he compares the ordinary person to a man sitting in a cave looking at a 
wall but seeing nothing except the shadows of the real things behind his back. 
Only the wise person, who is almost non-existent, has direct access to reality and 
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is  therefore likened to a man who has got out in the open and seen the real 
world of Ideas.
Nevertheless, Plato’s belief in an immaterial world should not be interpreted 
as a total negation of language and other types of signs we use. Although the 
world  of  Ideas  is  not  directly  accessible  to  us,  he  argues,  we  can  at  least 
approximate  to  the  nature  of  things  by  resorting  to  various  instruments  of 
thought. To get closer to the truth of circle,  for instance, we can achieve our 
purpose either by uttering and hearing the word /circle/ or by explaining and 
learning what is meant by the word or by drawing and seeing a sensuous image 
of it in the sand. No one can deny that the shape of a word is ephemeral and 
changes with time and its phonetic form is variable and differs from person to 
person, but a certain relationship of correspondence obtains between words and 
Ideas which serves as a bridge for sign users to reach the other world.
Although Plato propounded his metaphysics in ancient Greece well over two 
thousand years ago, such thinking, or at least its theoretic likeness, has not been 
confined to the time and place of its origin. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological 
theory of the sign, for example, is in many ways a 20th-century version of Plato’s 
theory  of  Ideas.  Like  his  Greek  predecessor,  the  German  philosopher  also 
conceives meanings as  a priori entities that may or may not be realized in the 
human semiotic systems. This is best exemplified by the fact that although all 
numerical figures are theoretically possible, only a small portion of them have 
actually been used. As Husserl himself puts it, 
As numbers – in the ideal sense that arithmetic presupposes – neither spring 
forth nor vanish with the act of enumeration, and as the endless number-
series thus represents an objectively fixed set of objects, sharply delimited by 
an ideal law, which no one can either add to or take away from, so it is with 
the ideal  unities of pure logic,  with its concepts,  propositions, truth,  or in 
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other  words,  with  its  meanings.  They are  an ideally  closed set  of  general 
objects, to which being thought or being expressed are like contingent. There 
are therefore countless meanings which, in the common relational sense, are 
merely possible ones, since they are never expressed, and since they can, 
owing to the limits of man’s cognitive powers, never be expressed. (Quoted in 
Nöth 1990: 99) 
Whatever percentage of those objectivities which do find their way into the 
repertoire of human signs, they get there by dint of what Husserl calls a silent 
intuitive  consciousness  which  is  immediately  “directed”  toward  the  states  of 
affairs or facts of the world and then re-creates them in words and other signs 
for  the  purpose  of  inter-subjective  communication.  This  is  so  because 
consciousness has the ability to re-present meanings ideally: physical objects or 
states of affairs cannot always be there for us, but they can be re-presented as 
ideal entities and thus be repeated in the process of communication.
As has been shown in Jacques Derrida’s later critique of the Husserlian theory 
of the sign,  Husserl  struggles to justify the absolute correspondence between 
pre-existing objectivities and their semiotic representations in the human world. 
By neglecting the constitutive nature of language and other types of signs, he 
stops short at consciousness as a neutral vehicle through which meanings and 
their expressions can “coincide”, hence employing a metaphysical presupposition 
and  adding  to  a  tradition  which  he  set  out  to  reject  in  his  manifesto  of 
phenomenology.
Turning our attention to the East for a while, there have been many Chinese 
philosophers  since  ancient  times  who  are  likewise  concerned  with  the 
relationship between names and actualities which, from the modern perspective, 
constitutes  an  important  aspect  of  semiotic  studies.  Of  those  who  have 
contributed to the knowledge in this field, one group stands out in the sense that 
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they are concerned with the name-actuality relationship not for its moral and 
political significance but for the metaphysical and epistemological aspect of the 
dichotomy itself.
The earliest name usually associated with this line of thinking is Mo Zi, who 
advocates a mimesis theory of meaning. According to him, names and actualities 
are  distinct  categories,  but  the  two  can  be  unified  because  the  former  are 
derived from the latter. The most quoted aphorism in relation to this topic by Mo 
Zi  is  “yi3  ming2  ju3  shi2”1 ( 以 名 举 实 ),  where  /ju3/  means  to  imitate  or 
designate, /shi2/ means extralinguistic actualities and /ming2/ means names that 
are used to imitate or designate. 
The Chinese philosophical discussion of the relationship between verbal signs 
and extralinguistic actualities reached a high tide during the subsequent period 
of the Warring States (403-222 BC). Unlike their predecessors and successors in 
the history of Chinese philosophy, scholars of this historical period as a whole 
showed a concentrated interest in the problem of the correspondence of names 
and  actualities,  for  which  they  were  given  the  collective  title  “the  School  of 
Logicians” (名家 ). Among them were Gongsun Long (c. 325-250 BC) and Xun Zi 
(298-238 BC), whose actual texts were not only known to their contemporaries 
but also preserved and therefore read and studied by later generations. 
Gongsun Long holds the belief that all things in the world appear in particular 
shapes and substances, and as such, they are given different names. To know 
whether the meaning of a word corresponds to its actuality or not, we have to 
know the conditions which give rise to it. As he puts it in Section 6 of his “On 
Names and Actualities”, “A name is to designate an actuality. If we know that this 
is not this and know that this is not here, we shall not call it [‘this’]. If we know 
that that is not that and know that that is not there, we shall not call it [‘there’].” 
(Chan [1969] 1973: 243)
Xun  Zi  is  a  more  systematic  thinker  on  the  word-actuality  relationship, 
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probably the most systematic among all ancient Chinese philosophers. He was 
born in a historical era which witnessed an epidemic of “discrepancies between 
words  and  actualities”,  a  deplorable  situation  which  drove  him  to  write  his 
famous  tract  “On  the  Rectification  of  Names”.  According  to  that  essay,  the 
motivations for rectifying names are political as well as epistemological. On the 
one hand, there is a need to distinguish the higher from the lower in terms of 
social status; on the other hand, we must discriminate the different states and 
qualities of things. “When the distinctions between the noble and the humble 
are clear and similarities and differences [of things] are discriminated,” he says, 
“there will be no danger of ideas being misunderstood and work encountering 
difficulties  or  being  neglected.”  From  there  Xun  Zi  proceeds  to  discuss  the 
theoretical possibility of achieving linguistic universality which is very similar to 
that proposed by his Greek counterpart Aristotle (384-322 BC). As is for his near 
contemporary in Greece, names or words are symbols of mental impressions for 
this  Chinese  philosopher.  He  argues  that  although  forms  and  colors  are 
distinguished by the eye, sounds and tunes are heard by the ear, sweetness and 
bitterness are differentiated by the mouth, freshness and foulness are smelled by 
the nose, and pain and comfort are felt by the skin, in the end the information 
we acquire through all these senses have to be processed by the mind, for it is 
because the mind collects knowledge that it is possible to know sound through 
the ear  and form through the eye.  Nevertheless,  the collection of  knowledge 
depends on the natural organs first registering it, and “the organs of members of 
the  same  species  with  the  same  feelings  perceive  things  in  the  same  way. 
Therefore  things  are  compared  and  those  that  are  seemingly  alike  are 
generalized.  In  this  way  they  share  their  conventional  name  as  a  common 
meeting  ground.”  Finally,  Xun  Zi  lays  down  what  he  calls  “the  fundamental 
principle on which names are instituted”. When things are similar, they ought to 
be  given  the  same name;  when things  are  different,  they  ought  to  be  given 
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different names;  when a simple name is  sufficient  to express the meaning,  a 
simple  name  ought  to  be  used;  when  a  simple  name  is  not  sufficient,  a 
compound name ought to be used.  “Knowing that different actualities should 
have different names, one should let different actualities always have different 
names. There should not be any confusion in this respect.” (Chan [1969] 1973: 
125) 
After Xun Zi, the discussion of the word-reality relationship gradually moved 
away from the center of Chinese intellectual speculations and never regained its 
position of dominance over other areas of human concerns till the 20th century 
when Western epistemology as an important branch of the social sciences was 
introduced into China through Marxist philosophy. This does not mean, however, 
that the Chinese curiosity in this respect stopped with the period of the Warring 
States.  On  the  contrary,  the  debate  about  the  word-reality  relationship  has 
continued,  be it  sporadically,  throughout  the history of  Chinese thought.  One 
important example of this can be found in a Chinese scholar  by the name of 
Ouyang Jian (c. 267-300), who picked up the same topic four and half centuries 
later and whose expositions further consolidated the realist theory of meaning in 
ancient China.
A well known essay by Ouyang Jian is entitled “On the Fullness of Speech in 
Expressing  Ideas”,  where  he  propounds  a  purely  instrumental  theory  of  the 
verbal  sign.  Continuing  the  realist  theme  but  pushing  it  to  its  ontological 
extreme, he argues that 
[h]eaven says nothing yet the four seasons run their course. Sages say 
nothing  yet  their  distinguishing  wisdom  exists.  The  difference  between 
square and round has been evident before the concepts of shapes arise; and 
the antithesis of black versus white has been obvious before the names of 
color  are  given.  Therefore  names  add  nothing  to  realities  and  speech 
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contributes nothing to [objective] principles.
However, for both the past and the present, to rectify names is always an 
important  task;  besides,  sages  and  worthies  have  to  use  speech.  Why? 
Because it is sure that one who finds a principle will not feel satisfied until he 
can express it by speech; a thing that already exists will not be identified from 
others without a name. If speech could not express ideas, people would not 
be  able  to  communicate  with  each  other.  If  names  could  not  distinguish 
things  from  each  other,  it  would  be  impossible  for  sages  to  show  their 
distinguished wisdom evidently. (Shi [1988] 1996: vol. 1, 317)
What  is  spelled  out  there  in  simple  but  emphatic  terms  are  two  important 
principles  of  the  realist  theory  of  meaning.  First,  independently  of  language, 
there exist ultimate qualities of things and states of affairs in the extralinguistic 
world. Second, meanings of words and expressions should and can correspond to 
extralinguistic actualities that are their sources as well as their measurements. 
If situated in the context of a world history of semiotics, Ouyang Jian’s text 
acquires  a  further  dimension  of  intercultural  and  intertextual  significance.  Its 
example of  the self-existing square can be linked to “The Seventh Epistle” by 
Plato, where the nature of the circle is also conceived as a pre-semiotic “form” 
which is then represented either in language or in painting. The second example 
of  pre-semiotic  color  differentiations  has  even  more  relevance  to  modern 
Western  semiotics,  for  the  formation  of  color  terms  in  language  not  only 
furnishes a point of departure for Saussurean and Hjelmslevean linguistics in its 
attack on the traditional language theories but also becomes one of the most 
debated issues in the 20th century humanistic scholarship.
Although contemporary Chinese theorization of language professes to be an 
application of Marxist philosophy to the study of language, on a deeper level it 
remains as much an heir to its native tradition of ontological realism. To a great 
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extent,  it  still  assumes the independent  existence  of  an  extralinguistic  world, 
natural as well as social. That is, to most contemporary language theorists, the 
essential  characteristics  of  things  exist  in  themselves  and would exist  even if 
there were no words to reveal them. However, there is one important difference 
between the ancient and the modern. Unlike their ancient predecessors, modern 
language theorists are more acutely aware of the trap of word-reality dualism 
where the correspondence between the two cannot be logically guaranteed.2 For 
this reason, they try to insert into the dichotomy a third element, that is, human 
cognition which is capable of achieving linear progression. In a wordless world, 
they argue, actualities of things are available for discovery, but such discovery is 
made possible by the formation of human consciousness after millions of years of 
evolution.  Whereas  consciousness  reflects  reality,  language is  the  means  that 
makes  it  possible.  Humans  use  words  to  designate  surrounding  objects  and 
phenomena,  their  connections  and  relations,  and  so  on.  Words  in  a  way 
substitute for objects, representing them in the human consciousness, but it also 
records the abstractive activity of human thinking. This means that words and 
phrases  are  the  result  of  a  generalized  cognition  based  on  sensations  and 
perceptions engendered by the impact on the human sense organs made by the 
objects and phenomena of reality. Furthermore, the process of cognition is an 
endless one in the course of which human thought draws closer to the essence of 
things of the extralinguistic world. From this perspective, the form of a language 
expression,  due to its  close connection with human consciousness,  ultimately 
communicates the essential nature of whatever is denoted by it.




1. The Arabic numerals 1, 2, 3, and 4 immediately following the Pinyin of Chinese characters are used here to 
indicate the four basic tones that exist in the Chinese language. As a picto-phonetic system, the Chinese 
language can generate a much smaller number of potential syllables than its alphabetic counterpart, so it 
has to resort to the use of different tones to make further semantic differentiations among words that 
otherwise sound the same. 
2 As recently as late 1970s, there began a heated debate among Chinese intellectuals about whether the 
nature of truth is absolute or local. Most, if not all, discussions that followed tend to go to either of the 
two  extremes:  if  a  “non-subjective”  criterion  is  insisted  upon,  they  have  to  rely,  consciously  or 
unconsciously, on an omnipotent agent who is capable of knowing a reality-in-itself which is historically 
impossible; if  “objectivity” is viewed as a “thing of this world”, they are usually forced to abandon all 
distinctions  whatsoever  between  truth  and  falsity.  Then,  there  is  a  theoretical  variant  of  the  first 
perspective which appears to have most followers in China, that is, the theory of praxis which upholds that 
“practice is the only measure of truth”. Understandably, the authority comes from Marx, who includes in 
his early notebooks a critique of abstract materialism in the name of active human practice: “The chief 
defect of all materialism up to now (including Feuerbach’s) is, that the object, reality, what we apprehend 
through our senses, is understood only in the form of the object of contemplation (anschauung); but not 
as sensuous human activity, as practice; not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism the active 
side was developed abstractly by idealism - which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such.” 
(McLellan 1977: 156) This is to say that human praxis is the guarantee of cognition as well as its point of 
departure. The world exists independently and attains its qualities and meanings for humanity by means 
of a mediating relationship of human labor, but besides serving as the mediating link between the world 
and human thinking, praxis also provides a means through which the latter can be measured against the 
former. As Mao Zedong put it in one of his philosophical essays:
Marxists hold that man’s social practice is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external 
world.  What  actually  happens  is  that  man’s  knowledge  is  verified  only  when  he  achieves  the 
anticipated results in the process of social practice (material production, class struggle or scientific 
experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he 
must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not 
correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make 
them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success; this is what 
is  meant  by  “failure  is  the  mother  of  success”  and “a  fall  into  the pit,  a  gain  in  your  wit”.  The 
dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that the 
human knowledge can  in  no way  be  separated  from  practice  and repudiating  all  the  erroneous 
theories which deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice. (1971: 67)  
Here,  true  and  objective  knowledge  is  defined  as  that  which  brings  fruits  in  praxis.  However,  the 
proposition constitutes at most a theoretic postponement, but not a solution, for in the end one still has 
to presuppose the existence of a super-subject (the working class, the proletariat, the Party or the great 
leader)  who  is  capable  of  correctly  measuring  the  result  of  “industry  and  experiment”  against  an 
independent reality.
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